If future relations between the Middle East/Islamic world and the west are to be based on a solid foundation, then the fate of the still ongoing Turkish experience may be not just influential, but decisive. 1
Introduction
This article examines the cultural basis of European opposition to Turkish accession to the European Union (EU). Most observers depict the cultural and religious dimensions of the European debate over Turkish accession as a disagreement between those who see Europe as a Christian 'club ' and those open to a more religiously pluralistic European identity. However, polls suggest that cultural and religiously based doubts about Turkish accession resonate with a much larger proportion of the European population than those who publicly defend the idea of an exclusivist 'Christian' Europe. Both secularists and Christian exclusivists ('traditionalists') express hesitations about Turkish membership:
Opposition to Turkish accession is coming from secular as well as religious quarters in Europe. Some nonreligious Europeans worry that bringing a large Muslim country into the EU could endanger the Continent's tradition of gender equality and tolerance of alternative lifestyles, for instance. For traditionalists, Turkish accession threatens the very idea of Europe as a Christian civilization. 2 Prevailing explanations of European resistance to Turkish accession that rely upon the assumption that opposition is based exclusively upon support for a 'Christian Europe' miss a crucial part of the story concerning the cultural and religious basis of this resistance. Cultural and religious opposition to Turkey's accession is not only about defending the idea of a Christian Europe, though this is a significant consideration. The prospect of Turkish accession has stirred up a more fundamental controversy about European identity and the politics of religion within Europe itself. Turkey has turned toward a different trajectory of secularism that conforms to neither Kemalism (a Turkish version of laicism), nor to the two prevailing trajectories of secularism in Europe: laicism and what I call 'Judeo-Christian' secularism. 3 This form of secularism threatens not only the Kemalist establishment in Turkey but European secularists as well. As a result, Turkey's potential accession to the EU has propelled the controversial question of what it means to be both 'secular' and 'European' into the public spotlight. There is a sense of urgency in Europe that the religion/politics question and its relationship to an ever-evolving European identity be resolved before Turkey is admitted to the EU. 4 The Turkish case is therefore controversial in cultural and religious terms not only because it involves the potential accession of a Muslim-majority country to an arguably, at least historically, Christian Europe, though this is important, but also and more fundamentally because it brings up long dormant dilemmas internal to Europe regarding how religion and politics relate to each other. 5 Turkey's candidacy destabilises the European secular social imaginary. 6 It involves unfinished business in the social fabric of the core EU members, including what it means to be 'secular' (both in Europe and in Turkey) and how religion, including but not limited to Islam, should relate to European public life. This cultural sticking point is what the debate over Turkish accession is really about, and it is for this reason that it is culturally -in addition to economically and politically -so contentious.
This argument suggests that even if economic and political obstacles to Turkish accession are lifted, even if Turkey is deemed to be in unambiguous conformity with the Copenhagen criteria, European opposition to Turkish membership will persist. This is due to nagging discord within Europe on two counts: (1) how religion relates to European identity; and (2) whether alternative trajectories of secularism such as the current Turkish one which moves away from European-inspired Kemalism toward a different variety of secularism can ever be considered fully 'European'. This is a more complex story than the assertion that European cultural and religiously based opposition to Turkey is based on the defence of the concept of a 'Christian' Europe. It also explains why many laicists in Europe have expressed ambivalence and, in some cases, opposition to Turkish accession despite their discomfort with the idea of a 'Christian' Europe.
To complicate matters, Turkish accession to the EU has become the symbolic carrier of domestic European angst about religion, and particularly Islam, and politics. 7 The powerful foundations and formulations of secularism that structure the debate in Europe and in (Kemalist) Turkey make it difficult to cope with what is often described as an 'Islamic challenge' to Europe, both internally and externally. Turkish candidacy for the EU makes these stumbling blocks in the European secularist imaginary explicit. It makes it evident that European approaches to religion and to religious minorities within its own borders are not set in stone but must be constantly renegotiated, and that expanding Europe to include Turkey will force another renegotiation of those standards by introducing new forms of secularism on the European horizon.
The concluding section of the article outlines the implications of this argument for IR theory. I argue that religious and secularist beliefs contribute to the creation of national identities and that these identities shape foreign policy and IR in significant ways. This connection between secularism and religion, national identity and international politics is rarely investigated. This article seeks to open up this field of inquiry in IR.
Europe-Turkey relations: 1963-2005
Although Turkey and the EU signed an Association Agreement in 1963, it was not until 1987 that Turkey applied for membership in the EU. In 1989, the European Commission rejected the application on the grounds that the Turkish economy was not sufficiently developed, that Turkish democracy failed to adequately guarantee political and civil rights, that unemployment in Turkey would pose a threat to the EU markets and because the dispute with Greece over Cyprus remained unresolved. 8 Recognising their common political, economic and security interests, however, the EU and Turkey reached a Customs Agreement that went into effect on 31 December 1995, granting the Turks 'closer economic ties with the EU than any other nonmember country at the time, with the exception of Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland, and opened the Turkish market of 65 million customers to EU companies'. 9 Relations cooled following the Commission's decision not to grant candidate status to Turkey at the Luxumbourg summit in 1997. Angered by this decision, the Turks announced that they would no longer consider the EU as a third-party mediator in Greek-Turkish affairs and in the Cyprus controversy, vetoed the European allies' ESDI plans on agenda-setting in NATO and opted not to purchase military hardware from EU states. 10 Following a thaw in EU-Turkish relations precipitated by Greek-Turkish cooperation following the Turkish earthquake in 1999, in December of that year the European Council in Helsinki reversed course, inviting Turkey to join the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) candidates with the assumption that Turkey would join the EU if it met the same criteria as the other candidates. 11 This landmark decision resulted from a compromise in which the EU agreed to lift the Greek veto, and in return Turkey agreed to adapt to the acquis communitaire and work cooperatively to solve disputes with Greece. 12 The EU agreed to review Turkish progress by the end of 2004. After 1999, successive Turkish governments began to implement democratising reforms in the areas of civil-military relations, human rights, cultural rights, judicial procedure, economic policy and Cyprus policy. 13 Although the EU did not name Turkey as part of the official strategy of expansion until 2010 at the Nice summit in December 2000, much to the Turks' consternation, in February of 2001 the European Council did declare an Accession Partnership with Turkey. In response, the Turkish government prepared its National Program for the Adoption of EU membership in March of that same year. 14 Relations soured again in Copenhagen in 2002 when the European Commission refused to set up a timetable for starting membership accession talks, outlining instead the political and economic conditions that Ankara would have to satisfy before talks would begin. 15 In a reflection of Turkish progress toward satisfying the Copenhagan criteria, however, in December 2004 the EU extended a conditional start-date of October 2005 for the talks.
On 4 October 2005, Turkey officially opened negotiations with the EU on the thirty-one chapters of the acquis. As Gordon and Taspiner have observed, however, 'even if the Council does agree to start accession talks, that process will be long, and would only be completed if and when all EU members -and the EU parliamentwere ready to take the revolutionary step of welcoming Turkey into the EU'. 16 To accede to the EU, Turkey will need to be in formal compliance with the 'Copenhagen criteria', adopted at the EU summit in Denmark in June 1993, which stipulate that member countries must: (1) be a stable democracy, respecting human rights, the rule of law and the protection of minorities; (2) have a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; (3) adopt the common rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (acquis communitaire). 17 Negotiations are expected to take at least a decade to complete; for budgetary reasons 2014 is the earliest date that Turkey could join the EU, and some analysts suggest that it could be as late as 2020. 18 Although a majority of Turks support joining Europe, 19 there is widespread disagreement in Europe itself regarding the benefits and drawbacks of Turkish accession. 20 In both France and Germany, for example, polls taken in February 2004 suggest that nearly 60 per cent of the population opposes Turkish membership in the EU. 21 'Turco-skeptics' cite a host of reasons for their opposition. Economic concerns are paramount, including fear of a reallocation of scarce resources to Anatolia that would strain EU structural funds, concerns about Turkey's ability to successfully adapt to European common policies, including the common agricultural policy (CAP) 22 and the social market economic model, fear of unwanted immigration of Turks to Europe in search of jobs, and other demographic implications of admitting Turkey -whose population exceeds the populations of all ten of the new states admitted to the EU in 2004 combined. 23 A second line of oppositional arguments cites Turkish domestic political shortcomings including lack of protection of minority rights, limited freedom of expression, including freedom of religion, the constrained independence of the judiciary, problematic civil-military relations and the failure to come to terms with the Armenian genocide in the early twentieth century. 24 Turkish relations with the 'near abroad', including Turkish policy in Cyprus (depicted as an illegal occupation of EU territory) are a subset of these concerns, as is the issue of how the future borders of Europe would be patrolled should they extend into Asia Minor.
A third category of concern involves the geopolitical wisdom of further EU expansion, in particular in an era when a significant proportion of the population in France -one of the two founding nations of the EU -is questioning the viability of the European project. 25 geographically largely outside Europe 26 and situated in a region plagued with conflict, instability, and terrorism'. 27 Fourth, critics cite procedural issues within the EU, including governance issues, as a reason to reject Turkey's candidature. According to this argument, if admitted, Turkey would exercise an inordinate amount of voting weight in the EU (particularly the European Council and the European Parliament) due to the structure of the new Constitution, in which political representation and voting weight in EU institutions is determined by population. 28 Other critics object to how negotiations by European leaders on the Turkish issue have been conducted, accusing the former of acting undemocratically and without transparency in decision-making procedures involving Turkish candidacy. 29 Though each of these factors is significant in its own right, European resistance to Turkish accession is rooted both differently and more deeply than is suggested by an exclusive focus on economic and political considerations within the EU or domestic politics within Turkey. In 2002, former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing observed that Turkey was 'not a European country' and that admitting Turkey to the EU would mean 'the end of Europe' 30 Former West German chancellor and Social Democratic party (SPD) leader Helmut Schmidt suggested that Turkey should be excluded from the EU due to its unsuitable civilisation, 31 and that by opening the door to EU admission for other Muslim nations Turkey's accession could result 'in the political union degenerating into nothing more than a free trade community'. 32 In September 2004, EU internal market chief Frederik (Frits) Bolkestein publicly stated that, 'the American Islam expert Bernard Lewis has said that Europe will be Islamic at the end of this century. I do not know if this is right, or whether it will be at that speed, but if he is right, the liberation of Vienna in 1683 would have been in vain.' 33 Fears of Turkey based on its 'non-European' cultural identity circulate among the population as well. As one reader of The Economist wrote in a letter to the Editor in 2002, 'Sir, Turkey clearly does not belong in Europe. Indeed, no Muslim country 26 Of course the definition of 'Europe' is itself at stake in this debate. As Rumelili observes, 'Europe is merely a geographical construct, with no natural or pre-given boundaries; the geographical parameters of Europe have not only shifted throughout the centuries but also within the short history of the European ''community'' as well'. Rumelili, 'Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference', pp. 39-40. 27 Gordon and Taspinar, 'Turkey's European Quest', p. 5. On the historical definition of 'Europe' see J. G. A. Pocock, 'What do we mean by Europe?', Wilson Quarterly, 21:1 (1997). Pocock argues that contemporary Europe 'is a set of arrangements designed to ensure that peoples will not again define themselves as states, and will surrender both the power to make war and the power to control the movements of market forces'. 28 Circulating within this charged environment, it is tempting to ascribe culturally and religiously based hesitations about Turkish accession to support for a 'Christian' Europe in the face of a potential 'threat' from a Muslim-majority state or civilisation. However, like the violence in the French cités, 37 the story is more complex than is suggested by this 'clash of civilisations' framework. Cultural and religious opposition to Turkey is not simply about defending the idea of a Christian Europe from an outside threat. This opposition is the cultural and political manifestation of the unsettled nature of the relation between religion, politics and European identity. It attests to the presence of unresolved issues concerning the politics of religion within Europe itself. By challenging prevailing notions of what it means to be 'secular' and 'European', Turkey's candidacy propels a series of difficult questions into the public spotlight and contributes to a sense of urgency among Europeans that they be settled before Turkey is admitted to the Union. The contestation and refiguration of dominant forms of European secularism -both inside and outside Europe -is at the heart of the debate over Turkish accession.
The next two sections fill in the content of this 'domestic' cultural opposition to Turkish accession. I do so by charting the influence of two competing discourses in Europe on the subject of religion and politics -Judeo-Christian secularism and laicism -upon the debate over Turkish accession to the EU. Drawing on Bahar Rumelili's recent argument in this Journal concerning two different dimensions of European identity -exclusive and inclusive -I explain how these two trajectories of 34 This 'third way' of secularism is an attempt to legitimate Turkish public order as both modern and Ottoman, as both secular and Islamic, thereby distinguishing itself from both Kemalism and the forms of secularism that emerged within Latin Christendom. This suggests that it is only when the EU redefines itself such that the inclusion of Turkey no longer threatens both exclusivist and inclusivist dimensions of the cultural and religious foundations of European identity will full Turkish integration become a possibility.
Judeo-Christian secularism and Turkish accession
Charles Taylor defines a social imaginary as 'the ways in which people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations'. 39 Laicism and Judeo-Christian secularism are important components of the European social imaginary. Together with the economic and political factors discussed above, these two strands of secularist political discourse contribute in significant ways to a climate of scepticism in Europe regarding Turkish accession. Building on Alev Çinar's definition, I approach secularism as a series of interlinked political projects that continually seek to 'transform and reinstitute a sociopolitical order on the basis of a set of constitutive norms and principles'. 40 38 As Lynch has shown in her study of attitudes to religious pluralism in theological discourse, there are many subtle variations in and alternatives to the categories 'exclusivism' and 'inclusivism.' She describes four such attitudes: exclusivism (my belief is superior and the only truth); inclusivism (my belief is right but yours may contain partial truths); pluralism (truth is multiple, other beliefs are equal to my own); and syncretism (it is possible and inevitable to merge aspects of different belief systems). Applying this framework to my argument, Judeo-Christian secularist approaches to European identity would be categorised as exclusivist, while their laicist counterparts would be generally inclusivist, with an occasional sprinkling of pluralism and syncretism. 41 A significant implication of this authoritative discourse is that the secularist separation of religion from politics, and the democratic settlement of which it is a part, is perceived as a unique Western achievement that is superior to its non-Western rivals. 42 If Judeo-Christianity is the foundation of secular democracy, and the separation of church and state is a unique achievement that evolved out of Christianity, then the potential for secularisation is tied to a particular cultural identity, civilisational history and geographic location. 43 Civilisational differences in the designation of the 'secular' and the 'religious' are fixed rather than fleeting. They cannot be transcended. This exclusivist approach to the cultural boundaries of democracy is the hallmark of Judeo-Christian secularism. 44 Judeo-Christian secularism has significant implications for the debate over Turkish accession. In Vers un Islam européen, for example, Olivier Roy argues that, 'Turkey will be rejected from the European Union not because the Turkish state fails to satisfy the EU's demands to democratise, which would be a good reason, but because Turkish society is not ''European'', meaning that it does not share the fund of Christianity that serves as the foundation of laicism itself'. 45 In other words, Turkey will not be admitted to the EU because although it is secular in some sense, key decision-makers in Europe and the majority of the European public do not believe it to be sufficiently secular in the 'European' sense. This is because Turkey does not share the common cultural and religious ground that serves to anchor European forms of secularism, and, by extension, European democracy. Samuel Huntington expressed this idea succinctly in The Clash of Civilizations: 'Where does Europe end? Where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begins'. 46 The Judeo-Christian secular formula for 'Europe' relies upon the assumption that full secular democracy can only be fully realised in societies possessing a (Judeo)-Christian heritage. In this view, the 'Judeo-Christian foundation' of European secularism and democracy, and of Europe itself, is the only foundation possible. A 2005 BBC poll in the UK confirmed the popular resonance of the connection between 'Europe' and Christianity. The poll found that nearly 75 47 Turkish EU candidacy consolidates these tacit and sometimes conflicting assumptions regarding Christian values and Christian heritage and their relevance to European identity and propels them into the public spotlight. 48 The presumed connection between Christian values and European forms of democracy contributes to an aversion to Turkish Islamic identity and scepticism about Turkey's potential as a non-Christian-majority secular democratic member of the EU. In this view, Turkey is inherently different from Europe due to the existence of an exclusive European identity based on geography, culture and religion. 49 European identity is conceived in bounded, fixed and exclusive terms, 'embodying a conception of difference that is based on inherent characteristics'. 50 This contrasts with a more inclusive version of European identity emphasising the possibility of a state becoming European by gradually acquiring a series of inclusive and (arguably) universal characteristics such as respect for liberty, human rights and secular democracy. 51 As an example of the influence of Judeo-Christian secularism upon European approaches to Turkey, consider the Judeo-Christian secularist response to the challenge to Kemalism in Turkey. From this perspective, this challenge confirms that secularisation and democratisation are unique to the (Judeo-Christian) West. Judeo-Christian secularists see resistance to Kemalism as proof of the futility of 'liberal' attempts to incorporate a Muslim-majority society into a democratic, secular (and Judeo-Christian) European Union. From this perspective Turkey is and always will be unable to conform to the Copenhagen criteria due to its cultural and religious commitments, and is therefore unfit to become fully 'European'. Distinctions between religious and political authority are historically absent not only from Turkey but from the 'Islamic world' in general, and are unthinkable due to the nature of Islam itself. In this view, Muslim-majority civilisations simply do not enjoy indigenous forms of secularism and insist upon rejecting the secularism imported from the West. 52 For Judeo-Christian secularists, secularism is ultimately incompatible with Islam and unlikely to be realised in Turkey or any other Muslim-majority society.
This opposition to Turkish accession on exclusivist cultural and religious grounds also carries within it a position on the identity of the EU and the subordinate place of religious, and particularly Muslim, minorities within that identity. By positing a unique set of connections between Judeo-Christianity, European identity and the potential for successful democratisation, Judeo-Christian secularists advocate a particular idea and identity of 'Europe' as exclusively Judeo-Christian. The divide between religious identities becomes one among many fixed markers of civilisational difference. This carries implications not only for Europe's external relations but also 47 for non-Judeo-Christian Europeans, with the latter easily portrayed as 'suspect citizens' and 'potential enemies within'. 53 The consequences of these divisions are evident in contemporary European politics.
Laicism and Turkish accession
Laicism is the second form of secularism contributing to a climate of scepticism in Europe regarding Turkish accession. Laicism refers to the attempt to purge religion from politics and is associated with intensive state control of religious institutions and expression. 54 The laicist model, particularly in France, is distinct from the American secular 'separation of church and state'. 55 Laicists support a vigorous role for the state in the regulation of religion and are wary of religious infringements in public space. They are sceptical about the democratic potential of any relationship between religion and politics that diverges from strict separationism as defined by the state. They view any increase in or reconfiguration of the public role of religion as an undesirable infringement upon would-be secular public life, a compromise of state authority and, in the French and Turkish cases in particular, a threat to national identity. 56 Rigorous state regulation of public religious expression and institutions are the result and any attempt to reconfigure the secular/religious divide away from a strictly regulative model is perceived as a threat to laicism. Andrew Davison, for example, defines Turkish Kemalism as 'a structure of power in which Islam was separated from areas of governance in some respects within an overall and overarching integrated relationship of state control'. 57 In contrast to their Judeo-Christian secular counterparts, who insist upon the fixed and exclusive nature of European identity, laicists believe that the exclusion of Turkey from Europe on cultural and religious grounds per se is unjustified. Laicism therefore leads to a different set of conclusions regarding European identity and its relationship to Turkish accession. Laicists adopt an inclusivist version of European identity and, as Rumelili argues, 'construct Turkey as different from Europe solely in terms of acquired characteristics.' 58 According to this argument, if Turkey conforms to European (laicist) norms regarding religion and politics, among other considerations, it should be admitted to the EU. The problem is not that Turkey is constitutionally and culturally incapable of complying with European standards, but 53 Silverstein and Tetreault, 'Urban Violence in France'. 54 On the origins of laicism and its implications for IR, see Hurd, 'The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations', pp. 242-6. 55 As Andrew Davison has shown, 'secularism' and 'laicism' should not be conflated: 'secularism and laicism are not two different words for the same institutional arrangement, but rather two distinct, complex, varied, contested, and dynamic possibilities in the range of nontheocratic politics'. For Davison Turkey is laicist rather than secularist because the Kemalists did not seek to separate religion from the state and pursue a nonreligious state inasmuch as they sought to use the state to control, regulate and mix Islam and politics in a particular way. rather that it has not yet satisfactorily achieved a particular level of (political, economic, and/or religio-political) development, such that 'if and when Turkey develops economic and political institutions in line with European values and standards, it will rightfully become a member of the EU, despite what others may claim to be its inherent differences'. 59 For laicists committed to the fact that Turkey will progress incrementally through a series of stages of development, culminating in its full 'Europeanisation', there is a sense that contemporary Turkey is not 'anti-Europe', but merely 'less Europe', to borrow Ole Waever's useful formulation. As Waever argues, 'the dominant trend in European security rhetoric is that the Other is Europe's own past (fragmentation), and those further away from the centre are not defined as anti-Europe, only less Europe. Europe has no clear border -it fades away as you move out over the Russian plains.' 60 Laicists equate Europe's past experiences with Turkey's present 'struggles' with secularisation.
As is the case with their Judeo-Christian secularist counterparts, however, laicists fear that this 'struggle', and specifically the current challenge to the Kemalist settlement in Turkey, may be sufficient to derail Turkish progress toward 'modernisation' and 'Europeanisation'. While in recent decades organised religion has declined in Europe, 61 Turkey is experiencing a revival of public religion that challenges European universalist norms regarding the (laicist) division between religion and politics upon which Kemalism was modelled. 62 For some, this challenge is enough to question Turkey's qualification for EU membership. Kemalism, from this perspective, represents a laudable attempt to bring Turkey into a modern, laicist and European 'present'. The revival of public religion -seen as a challenge to Kemalism -suggests that Turkey has not come far enough along the continuum of development. In this view, Turkey has not yet realised the progression out of a religious (Islamic) past into a laicist (European) present, and is at risk of 'backsliding' toward archaic practices regarding the public presence of religion and its formal control of the state. This fear is expressed in regretful terms as the 'loss of Atatürk's legacy' 63 and manifests in a concern about the intentions of the current governing party, Justice and Development (AKP): education, critics charge that the prime minister's commitment to secularism and liberalisation is only superficial. 64 For laicists, a post-Kemalist (assumed to be 'Islamist') Turkey is unfit to become fully European because it risks violating laicist norms that are among the founding principles of European democracy. Resistance to Kemalism, expressed in 'Islamic' terms, appears as a threat to the laicist strictly separationist public/private divide and concept and practice of religious freedom. 65 For laicists, unlike for Judeo-Christian secularists, the shortcomings involved in the presence of Islam in Turkish politics are not irremediable but can be overcome through the importation of Western-style democracy and the secularisation of politics and society. In this instance European identity is conceived in more inclusive terms, based on a series of acquired characteristics rather than a series of fixed cultural and civilisational traits. For laicists the solution to Turkey's potential 'back-sliding' into 'pre-Atatürk' approaches to religion and politics is a renewed commitment to Turkish state secularism, or Kemalism. Laicists therefore find themselves uncomfortably supporting the heavy-handed approach of the Turkish state and military vis-à-vis the regulation of public religion, and wary of attempts to challenge the Kemalist establishment. They view religious individuals and groups that are active in the public sphere as threats to democratic order, and consider state suppression of such groups legitimate and even warranted. As Kösebalaban points out, 'while the European governments and human-rights organisations including the European Court of Human Rights have been very sensitive to Kurdish human rights, they have maintained a persistent indifference to political problems like the headscarf issue and the closure of Islamic-leaning political parties'. 66 This makes for strange bedfellows, as laicists who otherwise support human rights and religious freedom find themselves unhappily aligned politically with the repressive and interventionist Turkish army. This state of affairs was reflected in American support for the Army's ouster of Welfare Party (RP) in 1997. As Erhard Franz argues, 'the USA, who had feared that Turkey under Erbakan would drift into the anti-American Islamic camp, views the Turkish military as the guarantor of the country's loyalty to the Western alliance'. 67 A June 2004 decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is an example of European support for the laicist attempt to exclude religion from the public sphere in Turkey. The ECHR concluding that Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights had not been violated by the Turkish refusal to allow Leyla Sahin, a Turkish medical student, to wear a headscarf while pursuing her studies at the University of Istanbul. This decision reflects and reinforces the ECHR's commitment to a laicist understanding of the proper relationship between 'religious' expression and democratic public space and discourse. The political potency of these 64 The argument developed in this article challenges the assumption that Turkish compliance with the Copenhagen criteria will be sufficient to ensure a smooth incorporation of Turkey into Europe. As Göle suggests, the encounter between Turkey and Europe is a two-way street that transforms both Turkish politics and the European project itself. 70 As I have shown, Turkish candidacy challenges and may even change European concepts and practices of secularism. Before admitting Turkey to the EU, Europe will press Turkey to accept a variety of European legal, financial and political institutions, standards and practices. Yet, paradoxically, in the domain of religion and politics Turkish integration into the EU will be successful only insofar as Europeans revisit their own assumptions about politics, religion and the moral foundations of democratisation.
In short, Turkish candidacy obligates Europeans to reconsider what it means to be a 'secular European'. Up to the present, this involved subscribing to laicism or Judeo-Christian secularism, or some combination thereof. Turkish candidacy changes and challenges the 'taken-for-grantedness' of the equation between European identity and these particular forms of secularism. It does so by introducing alternative trajectories of secularisation that draw upon non-Judeo-Christian traditions and proposing that they be accepted as equally 'European'. How Europe responds to this challenge remains to be seen. upon the 'one-way street' nature of the relationship between Turkey and the EU it will remain impossible, or at least very difficult, for Turkey to fulfil the demands placed upon it to 'modernise' along the lines of the European model as far as religion and politics are concerned. Turkey cannot be expected to follow either a JudeoChristian secularist model of secularisation or a laicist trajectory of secularisation, both of which evolved over the course of centuries out of a set of disputes within Latin Christendom.
Rather than impose either of these ill-fitting and arguably outdated secularist settlements upon the Turks and insisting that they adhere to them to qualify for EU membership, successful negotiations will require that Europe both acknowledge alternative cultural and religious formulations and foundations of secularism, and revisit its own collective assumptions about the relationship between religion, politics and European identity. Within Europe, this means coming to terms with the multiple and diverse civilisational sources and varieties of secularism. It means acknowledging that the role of religion in European collective identity is far from settled and may well remain so. 71 Between Europe and Turkey, it requires an acknowledgment of the complexity of the challenge to Kemalism: such challenges are neither simply 'religious' threats to 'secular' democracy, as laicist inclusivists suggest, nor are they a predictable retreat to archaic 'Muslim' forms of political order, as Judeo-Christian secularist exclusivists argue. Instead, these developments are part of a legitimate protest against the Kemalist attempt to monopolise what should be an ongoing, public debate over what it means to be a 'secular' Muslim-majority state. Jenny White has argued convincingly that democratic politics requires a continuing struggle over how the 'sacred' and the 'secular' are defined and practiced. 72 Challenges to Kemalism are part of this struggle insofar as they posit a rival Turkish public order that reconfigures the Kemalist settlement between secularism and Islamism, thereby forging a new model that is distinctive both from prevailing European modes of secularism and from Kemalism. As Hakan Yavuz has shown, the platform of Turkish 'Islamist' parties did not amount to 'an explicit program of Islamic revival but rather the reconstruction of Ottoman-Turkish norms and associations to challenge the alienating aspects of the Kemalist project'. 73 Charles Taylor observes that, 'we need to speak of multiple modernities, the plural reflecting the fact that non-Western cultures have modernised in their own ways and cannot be properly understood if we try to grasp them in a general theory that was originally designed with the Western case in mind.' 74 Modern variations of Turkish Islamism, rather than simply a threat to secular democracy or a revival of 'religion' in public life, are an example of how different forms of 'secularism' emerge in different cultural and political circumstances. As Göle has argued, 'although the cultural program of modernity has a great capacity to influence and circulate, the encounter between the two cultural codes leads not to a simple logic of emulation or rejection but to improvisations in social practices and cultural meanings'. 75 Turkish Islamism is such an improvisation. Rather than a pre-or anti-modern attempt to resuscitate a pristine Islamic past, Turkish Islamism is part of an attempt to reformulate 'the borders and the meanings of the secular public sphere' itself, serving as a 'destabilizing force' in secular (including secular European) social imaginaries. 76 As Çinar concludes, 'in Turkey Islamism has advanced an alternative nationalist project that is equally modernisationist to that of secularism and hence has produced what can be referred to as Islamic modernism'. 77 This challenge to Kemalism, to cite Talip Kucukcan, involves no less than 'the reconfiguration of religion and politics in the public sphere'. 78 Secularism, this argument suggests, is a contingent and contested social construction. As Yavuz argues, it is 'a terrain of contestation rather than a fixed ideological or behavioral understanding across time and space.' 79 Different foundations and formulations of secularism exist both within Europe and outside it. Multiple forms of secularism exist in both Christian and Muslim-majority societies. As I have shown, Turkish candidacy for the EU is politically inflammatory in part because it makes the historical contingencies of these different forms of secularism explicit. As Çinar argues, 'Islamist interventions served to reveal that secularism is neither natural nor a fact of public life, but indeed another forged and partial principle that is quite negotiable and contestable'. 80 Although some varieties of secularism did emerge out of Christianity, Europeans hold no monopoly on the separation of civil and religious authorities, mundane and metaphysical spaces, or sacred and secular institutions. Turkey fails to conform to European 'secular' standards only if Europeans define those standards à priori in terms of their political and religious history, and not their present or future.
The Negotiating Framework of October 2005 stipulates that, 'negotiations will be based on Turkey's own merits and the pace will depend on Turkey's progress in meeting the requirements for membership'. A significant choice for Europe in the next decade is whether to recognise the differing historical trajectories of secularism both in Europe and in Turkey, or to impose its own historical secularist expectations upon new and aspiring 'Europeans'. My argument suggests that for Turkish integration into the EU to succeed, negotiations must encompass not only Turkish progress in meeting European standards, but also a re-evaluation of those standards to acknowledge and incorporate alternative approaches to the politics of religion. As Asad concludes, 'if Europe cannot be articulated in terms of complex space and complex time that allow for multiple ways of life (and not merely multiple identities) to flourish, it may be fated to be no more than the common market of an imperial civilisation, always anxious about (Muslim) exiles within its gates and (Muslim) barbarians beyond'. 81 tradition to order its political affairs. 85 This article has shown that this is not the case. Authoritative cultural and religious systems of belief and the practices they engender are powerful determinants of modern domestic politics and influential contributors to contemporary international politics both in the West and outside it. Recognising how these forms of power operate allows a better understanding of crucial empirical puzzles in IR, including but not limited to the politics of EU enlargement.
